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Abstract – In this paper we evaluate the performance of 
a proposed local indicator of voltage emergency for a 
simulated unstable contingency of the Hellenic Intercon-
nected System identified through the on-line VSA applica-
tion for the summer peak of 2007. The effect of deadbands 
and tap range limits in delaying the emergency alarm 
issued is examined. The area mostly affected by the insta-
bility is identified through the proposed algorithm and a 
simple load-shedding scheme sufficient to avert the col-
lapse is suggested.  
Keywords: Voltage stability, emergency detection, 
load shedding, system protection schemes. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
System protection schemes (SPS) against voltage 
collapse include in many cases undervoltage load shed-
ding (UVLS) [1-4]. These schemes are based on the 
measurement of low voltages in the transmission system 
and require extensive tuning, so that they act only on 
real emergencies. On the other hand, an SPS against 
voltage collapse can be complemented by a real-time 
emergency indicator able to signal out a critical condi-
tion. This would certainly help to further automate cor-
rective emergency actions. To this purpose, a Local 
Indicator of Voltage Emergency Situations (LIVES) 
proposed in [5] is applied in this paper to the Hellenic 
Interconnected System operated by the Hellenic Trans-
mission System Operator (HTSO).  
The Hellenic Interconnected System is characterized 
by bulk North to South power transfers leading to volt-
age stability problems and has experienced a blackout 
of its southern part, due to voltage collapse, in July 
2004. Since then many upgrades were undertaken, how-
ever, a voltage instability threat is always present and an 
on-line Voltage Security Assessment (VSA) tool has 
been installed at the National Control Center of HTSO 
[6].  
This paper presents indicative results obtained by 
simulation of an unstable contingency that was identi-
fied by the VSA on-line tool during the summer of 
2007. The analysis includes the investigation of LIVES 
alarms produced in this case, as well as the evaluation 
of possible countermeasures for instability containment, 
such as local load shedding, based on LIVES alarms.  
In the next Section the LIVES algorithm is reviewed. 
Section 3 presents on-line VSA results for 2007 peak 
load of the Hellenic System, while in Section 4 the 
LIVES algorithm is applied for the case of an unstable 
contingency. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2 LOCAL INDICATOR OF VOLTAGE 
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS (LIVES) 
2.1 Stability of a multi-LTC system 
Let us consider in this Section a power system whose 
long-term dynamics are those of the Load Tap Changers 
(LTC) of bulk power delivery transformers. In the simu-
lations performed in later Sections other long-term 
devices, such as OverExcitation Limiters (OELs) will 
be considered.  
As shown in Fig. 1, the variable ratio ri is considered 
to be on the primary (transmission) side and the LTC is 
controlling the secondary (distribution) voltage Vi. Load 
is considered voltage dependent. Short-term dynamics 
are assumed to be stable, as only long-term voltage 
stability issues are addressed. 
 
Figure 1:  Transformer LTC feeding voltage-sensitive load 
Let m be the number of LTC-controlled loads. To fa-
cilitate the analysis, we assume that all LTCs have the 
same tap ratio step ∆s and period of operation T. The 
general case of different tap step and time delay for 
each LTC can be handled as described in [5]. 
The LTC mechanisms are discrete with a voltage 
deadband. Thus at every period of operation T the i-th 
transformer ratio changes according to the difference 
equation: 
( ) ( ) ki ir kT r kT T ri= − + ∆   (1) 
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where Vimin and Vimax are the lower and upper deadband 
limits. 
The long-term stability of the system is linked to the 
Jacobian of secondary voltages with respect to tap ra-
tios: 
 / , 1,...,i jV r i j m = ∂ ∂ = A  (2) 
The vector of secondary voltage changes at each step 
k under the above assumptions is given approximately 
by the linearized expression: 
k k∆ = ∆V A r         (3) 
where ∆r is the vector of tap ratio changes. 
Stability of this linearized discrete system is guaran-
teed if all voltage errors outside the deadband decrease 
at each step. A necessary condition to achieve this cor-
rection is that the diagonal elements aii of A are nega-
tive, so that each tap change performed according to (1) 
will decrease the error at the corresponding bus. How-
ever, this condition is not sufficient for stability because 
the other taps may counteract this error correction. If, 
however, matrix A is diagonally dominant with negative 
diagonal elements, the error correction achieved by the 
diagonal term cannot be counteracted whatever the 
direction of movement of the other taps. We thus obtain 
the following sufficient stability condition, originally 
derived in [7]: 
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Usually the off-diagonal elements are positive (as will 
be discussed later on), so that the absolute sign can be 
dropped in (4). 
Let us now assume that after a severe disturbance all 
voltages (at least in the area of interest) are below dead-
band. As a consequence, each LTC will react in every 
period T by decreasing its ratio by the amount ∆s. Un-
der these conditions, the change ∆Vi made to voltage Vi 
at step k is given by: 
       ∆ =        (5)    ( )ki ij ii
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The similarity between the expression in parentheses 
and the sufficient stability condition (4) suggests that 
the change in controlled voltage could be used to moni-
tor stability. However, before proceeding we should 
examine the sign of sensitivities, in order to remove the 
absolute value from (4). 
As discussed above, the diagonal elements aii must 
all be negative for stability. This condition generally 
holds in normal loading conditions, for which each ratio 
ri is above the value maximizing Vi with all other taps 
being considered constant. When this maximum is 
reached aii becomes zero, and for even lower taps it 
changes sign. Clearly, maximizing Vi results also in 
maximum power consumption, if the power sensitivity 
to voltage is positive, which is the usual case. Note 
again that this maximum refers to all ratios except the i-
th one being constant.  
Assuming that all loads are non-capacitive, the sign 
of an off-diagonal sensitivity aij can be indirectly as-
sessed as follows: the increase in the load consumed at 
bus j brought about by a decrease of ratio rj will result 
in a decrease of transmission voltages. If all other taps 
remain constant, this will result in a decrease of the 
secondary voltages of the corresponding LTCs.  
When these conditions hold, the sufficient stability 
condition (4) becomes simply: 
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which suggests that, after a large disturbance, instability 
can be detected locally by simply monitoring an LTC-
controlled voltage. Note that the violation of (4) is also 
a necessary condition for matrix A to become singular 
[5], thus instability can be detected through (6) before 
the bifurcation surface is encountered. As we will see in 
the case study, however, in practical situations, espe-
cially when instability is marginal, the identification of 
the violation of (6) can be delayed due to deadbands 
and LTC control range limits. 
2.2 Principle of LIVES operation 
The Local Identifier of Voltage Emergency Situa-
tions (LIVES) is based upon the detection of secondary 
(controlled) voltages going through a maximum during 
the post-disturbance evolution, while still below dead-
band. It could be easily incorporated into the control 
logic of LTCs and uses only information available in 
the LTC, namely secondary voltage, deadband limits 
and time delays between tap changes. In this paper we 
will use a method of emergency identification based 
solely on (6). The effect of measurement noise and a 
filtering scheme based upon moving average are inves-
tigated in [12].  
LIVES logic is very simple: to initiate the detection, 
the LTC must be active (i.e. not limited, nor blocked), 
and the controlled voltage must be below its lower 
deadband limit. As a consequence, LIVES is reset each 
time the secondary voltage is restored within the dead-
band and becomes inactive after the LTC has exhausted 
its tap ratio range. 
The secondary voltage values relative to successive 
tap changes are compared through:  
( ) [( 1)ki i iV V kT V k T∆ = − −               (7) 
According to (5), in a system whose dynamics con-
sist only of LTCs, a secondary voltage drop after one 
period of LTC operation means that the sum of the 
corresponding row of the long-term state matrix A has 
crossed zero and thus the sufficient stability condition is 
violated.  
However, in a real system other events (such as gen-
erator switching under overexcitation limit) occur, 
which result in voltage drops that are not due to the 
action of LTCs. Thus, in a real system, a single voltage 
drop after a period of LTC operation is not a sufficient 
indication of the violation of (6). Thus, in order to issue 
a voltage emergency alarm an additional delay is neces-
sary to ascertain that secondary voltage is dropping due 
to LTC actions.  
 To this purpose, we specify in this paper that ∆Vik 
must be negative for two successive values of k to de-
tect an emergency situation. The overall delay for insta-
bility detection is in the time frame of two LTC periods 
of operation, roughly around 20 s, which is considered 
acceptable for emergency control against long-term 
voltage instability.  
Of course it remains possible that random events 
cause two successive voltage drops within two periods 
of LTC operation. It could be argued, however, that in 
such a situation the system would be sufficiently weak-
ened by these events to justify an emergency action. 
3 HELLENIC INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM 
3.1 System Description 
The Hellenic Interconnected System serves mainland 
Greece and some adjacent islands. The main production 
center is located in the northwest part of the country, 
close to lignite mines, while the main center of con-
sumption lies in the South including the metropolitan 
area of Athens. The transmission system operates 
mostly at the levels of 400 kV and 150 kV.  
The geographical distance between generation and 
consumption leads to bulk transmission in the North-
South direction. This transfer is continuously increasing 
due to the development of yearly peak loads (mainly in 
the South), which occur during the summer period and 
the difficulties encountered in building new transmis-
sion facilities. Thus, on various occasions the Hellenic 
System has faced critical operational conditions in the 
form of voltage instability. 
Network reinforcements completed after the 2004 
blackout [8] have considerably increased the loadability 
of the system, as shown in [6]. Further projects involv-
ing the installation of new generation have also been 
completed since.  
3.2 On-Line VSA using QSS Simulation 
Apart from system reinforcements, an on-line Volt-
age Security Assessment (VSA) application [9] has 
been installed in 2005 in the Control Center of HTSO. 
The on-line VSA is currently in operation, using data 
validated by the 2004 blackout simulation [8], and pro-
vides security margin information and loadability limits 
periodically, or upon request. 
The computations performed within the VSA appli-
cation are based on Quasi Steady-State (QSS) simula-
tion, a fast time-domain method well suited to the 
analysis of long-term voltage stability phenomena [10]. 
The QSS approximation relies on time-scale 
decomposition. The essence of this method is that faster 
phenomena are represented by their equilibrium 
conditions instead of their full dynamics. This greatly 
reduces the complexity of the resulting model and hence 
provides the computational efficiency required to meet 
the constraints of the on-line application.  
This method, which has been validated with respect 
to detailed time simulation, offers better accuracy and 
richer interpretations than simple methods based on 
load flow equations. Under the QSS approximation, the 
short-term dynamics of a synchronous generator, its 
governor and its Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR), 
are replaced by nonlinear algebraic equations [10], 
which account for the generation saturation, the AVR 
steady-state gain and the speed droop. These nonlinear 
equations are solved at each time step, together with the 
network ones. QSS simulation reproduces the long-term 
dynamics of LTCs discussed in the previous section, but 
also includes models for OELs, automatically switched 
shunt compensation, other protection devices, etc. This 
simulation takes into account the delays between trans-
former tap changes, before a synchronous machine is 
switched under field current limit, etc. 
As the QSS simulation is readily available from the 
on-line VSA application, it was convenient to carry out 
first tests on the proposed LIVES algorithm with this 
tool, even though tests on detailed models (with simu-
lated measurement noise, etc.) are essential for a future 
application.   
3.3 On-line VSA Results for 2007 Peak Load 
As a result of continuing system upgrades and rein-
forcements, the overall voltage security of the Hellenic 
Interconnected System is much improved compared to 
the recent past. In the Summer of 2007 the total system 
load peaked above 10500 MW, which is a new histori-
cal maximum of the Hellenic System. On this day the 
system faced voltage security problems only with re-
spect to the most critical contingencies involving sig-
nificant loss of generation in Athens and Peloponnese 
regions.  
In the region of Athens the major concern is the dou-
ble contingency leading to the loss of both circuits of 
the 400 kV line serving two combined-cycle units with 
a total generation of 955 MW located at Lavrio Thermal 
Power Plant (TPP). This contingency appeared to have 
zero security margin, as monitored through the on-line 
VSA for the peak loading conditions of July 23rd, 2007.  
 
No. Name SOL (MW)
289 LINE_CON_KTHES-SCHOLAR.1 0 
149 GEN_CON_MEGALO_2.GEN4.UN 0 
359 LINE_CON_MOURT-MESOG.1 0 
321 LINE_CON_KYL-ZAKYN.1 0 
234 LINE_CON_PTOL-KOZ.1 0 
134 GEN_CON_K_LAVRIO.CC5.GFIC.UN 0 
177 LINE_CON_ARG2-ARG1.1 0 
50 DLINE_CON_ PELO-EPIR 109 
143 GEN_CON_MEGALO1.GEN1.GEN2. 133 
93 GEN_CON_IRON_K_LAVRIO.GFIC. 148 
127 GEN_CON_ KOMO.GFIC.UN 195 
70 DLINE_CON_MEGA2-PYRG 203 
57 DLINE_CON_KTHES-EVOSM 219 
 All others >200 
 
Table 1:  Secure Operation Limits (SOLs) for July 23, 2007 
 Note that for this contingency, as well as for similar 
critical contingencies in Peloponnese, event-driven 
SPSs involving load shedding have been designed and 
put in operation [11]. The Secure Operation Limits 
(SOLs) [10] for the peak of this specific day (close to 
1:30 pm) are shown in Table 1. As seen in the Table, 
contingencies no. 149 (loss of a 300 MW unit in Pelo-
ponnese) and the double contingency involving Lavrio 
TPP that was described above (no. 134) have zero secu-
rity margins. The other contingencies shown in Table 1 
with a zero margin refer to weak parts of the network 
and have only local impact [6,9]. 
The voltage evolution of the most affected transmis-
sion bus in the system for the simulated contingency 
134 is shown in Fig. 2. The simulation was performed 
by the on-line VSA software (program ASTRE), which 
is using the QSS simulation approach. As seen, the 
ultimate outcome of the contingency would be a voltage 
collapse at simulated time t=240s. The collapse in this 
sense is due to the loss of short-term equilibrium of the 
system. 
 
Figure 2:  Voltage Evolution for contingency 134 
4 APPLICATION OF LIVES ALGORITHM 
In this Section we investigate the performance of the 
above-described LIVES algorithm for the specific simu-
lated contingency no. 134 of July 23, 2007 as a first 
attempt to assess whether this scheme has relative mer-
its with respect to the event-driven SPS.  
As stated above, aspects relative to noise and filter-
ing techniques [12] will not be addressed here. How-
ever, other real system aspects, such as the effect of 
deadbands and hard limits on LTC regulation range will 
be investigated in some detail.  
Two approaches will be used. First the buses where 
LIVES would give a timely alarm are determined and 
then the effect of load shedding following the alarm is 
investigated taking into account LTC hard limits and 
also generator armature current constraints. 
4.1 Determination of buses for alarm monitoring 
During the computation of SOLs, the hard limits on 
LTCs are artificially suppressed, so as to allow full 
power recovery for all voltage sensitive loads. Thus, the 
response of Fig. 2 is drawn under this assumption (LTC 
limits neglected).  
In this subsection we follow the same approach. The 
simulation was repeated off-line with increased data 
accuracy and the collapse was found to occur at 280 s. 
At the same time, LIVES algorithm was executed for all 
LTC transformers using the criterion of voltage recov-
ery as explained in Section 2.2. 
The results in terms of the timely alarms, together 
with the corresponding simulation time that they were 
issued, are shown in Table 2. As seen, in 10 buses the 
LIVES alarm is issued 20 seconds before the collapse, 
whereas in another 15 distribution buses the alarm is 
issued 10 seconds before the collapse. In 17 other buses 
(not shown in Table 2) the alarm is issued at 280s. This 
is considered too late for taking any corrective action. 
 
No. Bus Time Area 
1 GTRICH52 260 West 
2 GAETOL51 260 West 
3 GAETOL52 260 West 
4 G1PATR51 260 Peloponnese 
5 G2PATR51 260 Peloponnese 
6 G3PATR51 260 Peloponnese 
7 GAEGIO51 260 Peloponnese 
8 G1PATR52 260 Peloponnese 
9 G3PATR52 260 Peloponnese 
10 GPTIT_31 260 Peloponnese 
11 GTRICH51 270 West 
12 GVZPAT51 270 Peloponnese 
13 GXILOK51 270 Peloponnese 
14 GXILOK52 270 Peloponnese 
15 GKRANI51 270 Peloponnese 
16 GLECHE51 270 Peloponnese 
17 GLECHE52 270 Peloponnese 
18 GAMALI51 270 Peloponnese 
19 GKIPAR51 270 Peloponnese 
20 GPYRGO51 270 Peloponnese 
21 G2PATR52 270 Peloponnese 
22 GKIPAR52 270 Peloponnese 
23 GPYRGO52 270 Peloponnese 
24 GZAKIN51 270 West 
25 GZAKIN52 270 West 
 
Table 2:  LIVES alarms for contingency 134 of July 23, 2007 
It the last column of Table 2 the area of the bus, 
where the alarm was issued is shown. Figure 3 shows 
the significant details of the connections of Peloponnese 
peninsula in the case considered. In particular, a small 
part of Western Greece was connected radially through 
two 150 kV submarine cables to Peloponnese and was 
disconnected from the rest of the system at Kastraki 
Hydro-Electric Plant (HEP). This topology was selected 
in order to achieve better control of the flow through the 
submarine cables. 
It is worth noting that even though the disturbance 
originated in the area near Athens the alarms are issued 
in the Northwest part of Peloponnese, the island of 
Zakynthos and the part of Western Greece connected to 
 Peloponnese. The ultimate result causing the loss of 
equilibrium in the QSS simulation is the loss of syn-





Figure 3:  Peloponnese connections 
This result may have useful consequences for redes-
igning protection systems against this contingency. 
Indeed a decentralized system based on LIVES moni-
toring could in principle be able to set the trigger for a 
local load shedding in the area of Patra that could avert 
an imminent voltage collapse. 




















Figure 4:  Voltages in Peloponnese and Western Greece 
 
However, the effect of LTC limits has still to be as-
sessed. This is done in the next subsection. Note also 
that the voltage level at transmission buses could also 
be used for triggering a local protection. As an example 
consider the voltage responses of some key transmis-
sion buses in Peloponnese and Athens area shown in 
Figs  4 and 5. 
As seen in these figures, at the time the LIVES 
alarms were issued, transmission voltages in Patra and 
Athens are already below 85%. Note however, that even 
in other buses (not directly affected by the instability in 
question), as in Methana (East Peloponnese) voltages 
are even below 80%. In the Hellenic System many 
instances of low voltages, not leading to collapse, have 
been experienced in the past, and thus selection of a low 
voltage threshold for possible load shedding is quite 
complicated. Hence, LIVES could help ascertaining that 
the level of system degradation is sufficient to justify an 
extreme action, such as load shedding. 

















Athens area buses 
 
Figure 5:  Voltages in Athens area 
4.2 Evaluation of load-shedding based on LIVES 
In this subsection we repeat the QSS simulation of 
the same contingency for July 23, 2007, but this time 
including the limits on LTC tap range. The effect of 
LTC limits is that the devices that have exhausted their 
control range do not enter in the summation of (6). This 
definitely delays the onset of instability, as well as the 
emergency detection by the LIVES algorithm. Note also 
that as long as some LTCs are able to reach their dead-
band, they too do not participate in the summation of 
(6), thus the emergency condition monitored by LIVES 
is even further delayed. 
In this simulation, in addition to LTCs and OELs, the 
effect of armature current limit [8] on generators is also 
included. As generators located near the load center 
become overexcitation limited, some of them are forced 
to reduce active power output to avoid stator overcur-
rent due to the resulting low terminal voltage.  
As seen in Fig. 6a and 7a, where the voltages at the 
transmission (150 kV) buses at Rouf substation in Ath-
ens and a substation in Patra are shown respectively, the 
system in this case is still collapsing but with a much 
slower pace, so that the final collapse (loss of short-term 
equilibrium) occurs at simulated time t=620s. 
Applying again the LIVES algorithm it is seen that 
this time, due to the tap limits reached in some impor-
tant buses in the area of Patra, only the distribution 
buses in the part of Western Greece connected to Pelo-
ponnese issue an alarm 20 seconds before the collapse 
at time t=600s.  
The tap ratio and the distribution side voltage of bus 
GAETOL51 is shown in Fig.8. As seen distribution side 
voltage starts decreasing after the tap at t=590s and after 
the second unsuccessful tap change of t=600s an alarm 
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Figure 7:  Voltage at Patra (without and with load shedding) 
This simulation shows that due to the combined ef-
fect of tap limits and deadbands the LIVES alarm may 
be signaled in few buses only. Thus we consider in the 
sequel a protection system, which based on a single 
alarm would shed 20% of the load at all buses of Table 
2, except a few ones representing industrial or agricul-
tural loads, as well as the load on the island of Zakyn-
thos. The amount of load shed on each distribution bus 
is shown in Table 3. As seen the total load shed in this 
scheme is less than 100 MW. This amount is considered 
close to the minimum that can create a significant effect 
on the system. Thus a smaller amount, or a gradual, 
more refined shedding is not considered in this paper. 















Figure 8:  GAETOL S/S distribution voltage and tap position 
Bus ∆P (MW) ∆Q (MVar) 
GTRICH51 -3.77 -2.47 
GTRICH52 -3.30 -3.43 
GAETOL51 -2.57 -1.61 
GAETOL52 -4.97 -1.92 
G1PATR51 -5.75 -2.40 
G1PATR52 -5.19 -2.90 
G2PATR51 -3.07 -1.16 
G2PATR52 -3.82 -2.03 
G3PATR51 -6.68 0.00 
G3PATR52 -6.70 0.00 
GVZPAT51 -6.31 0.00 
GXILOK51 -2.38 0.00 
GXILOK52 -2.31 0.00 
GKRANI51 -6.15 0.00 
GAMALI51 -3.20 -0.65 
GAEGIO51 -5.68 -1.96 
GAEGIO52 -3.90 -2.43 
GKIPAR51 -2.58 0.00 
GKIPAR52 -5.74 -1.09 
GPYRGO51 -2.59 0.00 
GPYRGO52 -6.36 0.00 
Total -93.01 -24.06 
 
Table 3:  Load shedding per bus 
The effect of the proposed load shedding in avoiding 
the collapse is clear in Figs 6b and 7b. Thus the use of 
LIVES alarm to shed load locally in the area indicated 
by the buses in Table 3 is able to prevent an imminent 
blackout. Voltages in Athens region, which remain still 
 very low after load shedding, can be adjusted at a later 
stage. 
Judging by the amount of load that is sufficient to re-
store stability, this is a rather marginal instability case. 
Note that the less severe the instability, the more time it 
takes for LIVES to identify it. This is not necessarily a 
disadvantage, as faster action for more severe cases is in 
general desirable. 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper reviewed a new method for local identifi-
cation of voltage emergency that can be used as part of 
an SPS that will contribute in protecting the Hellenic 
Interconnected System against the danger of voltage 
collapse. In particular, the performance of the proposed 
indicator was evaluated through the simulation of the 
most dangerous contingency identified during peak load 
conditions by the on-line VSA operating at the HTSO 
Control Center. 
The simulation of the unstable contingency showed 
that the proposed LIVES algorithm was able to identify 
through simple local measurements the area mostly 
affected by the instability, which includes the part of 
Western Greece connected to Peloponnese, as well as 
several buses in western Peloponnese mainly in the 
wider area of Patra. 
The main advantage of the proposed algorithm is 
definitely its simplicity, since it can be implemented 
locally at each LTC requiring only readily available 
measurements. In theory, when all LTCs are acting, the 
LIVES algorithm can identify an emergency before the 
stability limit is reached. However, the study performed 
demonstrated that the alarm could be considerably de-
layed because of the combined effect of deadbands and 
LTCs exhausting their tap range. As a result it may be 
advisable to use some minimal communication, so that, 
if at least one alarm is issued, load could be shed from 
several buses in a small area in a coordinated manner. 
In any case, it was shown in the paper that a discon-
nection of less than 100 MW of load in the small area 
identified through LIVES simulation would be suffi-
cient to avert the voltage collapse caused by the most 
dangerous contingency considered so far. 
Ideally, it would be desirable to install a purely de-
centralized, closed-loop load-shedding system that 
would disconnect variable amounts of load in multiple 
steps, as in [3], using the LIVES alarms to initiate and, 
if needed, repeat the shedding actions. However, when 
some LTCs reach their control range limits, LIVES 
cannot perform a stability test on the corresponding 
buses. On the other hand, it is likely that these buses are 
among the most effective for load shedding, as their 
transmission voltage will be the most depressed. Thus 
some type of coordination seems to be necessary, al-
ways within a predefined relatively small area, for a 
successful emergency control scheme. A technique to 
overcome the above problem is proposed in [13]. 
Clearly, further research is necessary to investigate 
several implementation issues, such as measurement 
noise and filtering, as well as the coordination between 
LIVES and existing or future SPS designs. 
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